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Abstract
In the property rights theory of the firm, control over assets (ownership) affords bargaining
power in the case of re-negotiation, providing incentives for parties to make relationship
specific investments. The models predict that property rights will be allocated so as to
maximise surplus generated from investment.
However, these models assume that investments are made simultaneously. In this
thesis I extend the standard property-rights framework to allow for sequential investment;
the model allows for two investment periods. If a party invests first (ex-ante), they sink
their investment before any contracting is possible. The parties that invest second (ex-
post) do so after some of the aspects of the project are tangible, so that they can contract
on (at least some) of their investment costs.
As well as being empirically relevant, sequencing has several important theoretical
implications. First, if a party gets to invest second, then – ceteris paribus – it has a
greater incentive to invest. Second, the investment of parties that invest first are affected
by a more than one influence. Anticipating higher ex-post investment, they can have a
greater incentive to also increase their investments. However, higher ex-post investment
leads to greater costs being borne by the ex-ante investors (via the cost sharing contracts);
this reduces ex-ante incentives to invest. Overall either effect can dominate so that ex-ante
investment can either increase or decrease as a result of sequential investment. Third, as
noted, sequencing of investment provides the possibility to (partially) contract on ex-post
investment and costs. This is an additional method of providing incentives to invest,
beyond the allocation of property rights themselves. Consequently, ex-post investors can
be protected (and be provided incentives to invest) via these contracts, whereas ex-ante
investors – who can not contract on their investments at all – are more likely to require
the protection of property rights (the allocation of asset ownership).
The addition of sequential investment alters some of the predictions of the standard
models. For example, previously the literature found that if all assets are complements
at the margin all agents should have access to all assets (Bel (2005)). However, when
investment sequencing is possible, making a control structure more inclusive (increasing
the number of agents who have access to assets) can reduce the incentives of the ex-ante
investors, decreasing overall surplus; this is because increasing the property rights of ex-
post investors increases the marginal costs borne by ex-ante investors, effectively reducing
their claim on surplus, diminishing their incentives to invest. This result contradicts Bel
(2005), and shows that even when all assets are complementary at the margin allocating
access rights can be detrimental to incentives.
Furthermore, if assets are substitutes at the margin then transfer of assets from ex-ante
investors to ex-post investors can increase ex-ante investment and surplus. This counter
intuitive result can occur in the case when decreasing ex-post investment is necessary to
provide an incentive to ex-ante investors to increase their investments.
(JEL classification: D23)
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Chapter 1
Introduction
When trade requires relationship-specific investments, incomplete contract-
ing can lead to investment inefficiencies and under-investment in profitable
projects. A clever re-assignment of property rights, such as access and veto,
can change the bargaining power of the agents and alleviate the hold-up prob-
lem by protecting some of the returns to investment from opportunistic be-
haviour and expropriation at the time when re-negotiation occurs. According
to this asset-based view, the boundaries of all firms are driven by the objec-
tive of minimising the ill-effects of the hold-up problem and to maximise the
(overall) investment incentives of entrepreneurs, managers, employees and
sub-contractors.
However, the traditional model is somewhat limited by the requirement
that all relationship specific investments be made simultaneously before any
contracts can be written. In reality, of course, investments might have to be
made in a sequential process. Moreover, imposing simultaneous investment
denies the real possibility that some agents invest first, when contracts are
incomplete, helping make a project tangible so that the agents that invest
second (finalising the project) do so in a more complete contracting envi-
ronment. While allowing sequential investment adds realism, it also leads
to interesting new economic predictions concerning the optimal allocation of
property rights.
Broadly speaking, in the model parties either invest first (ex-ante) or sec-
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ond (ex-post). As in the standard model, if parties invest ex-ante they do so
before contracting is possible. However, these initial investments allow the
project to take shape, furthering the possibility of writing contracts concern-
ing the investments of the ex-post parties. It is immediate that investing
first or second has markedly different incentives. The first implication of the
model is that the possibility of investment sequencing has a positive effect
on ex-post incentives, because ex-post cost-sharing reduces the hold-up prob-
lem facing the parties who invest second. Solving backwards, this anticipated
change in ex-post investment also affects ex-ante investors. A priori, ex-ante
investments can increase or decrease as a result of sequencing, depending on
whether the disincentive to invest from the greater marginal costs imposed on
the ex-ante investors (due to ex-post cost sharing contracts) is outweighed
by the greater incentive to invest that arises due to higher second period
(ex-post) investment.
Altering the incentives to invest for both the first and second investors,
can clearly have an impact on the optimal allocation of ownership (or prop-
erty rights). In the first instance a natural consequence of investment se-
quencing is that ex-ante agents rely more heavily on property rights to pro-
tect their investment returns from hold-up than do ex-post agents who are
protected because of cost sharing contracts.
Other predictions also arise, as an example when all assets are comple-
mentary at the margin then the simultaneous investment model of Bel (2005)
finds that a more inclusive control structure always raises equilibrium invest-
ment – greater access rights increase a party’s incentives to invest without
diminishing any other party’s incentives to invest. This is not always the
case when investments are sequential because cost-sharing contracts and in-
terdependence between first and second investors mean that if more control
is given only to ex-post agents then it is possible that ex-ante incentives
decrease. In some situations it may even be optimal to reduce the set of
assets controlled by ex-post agents despite the fact that all assets are com-
plementary. The reason is that, due to ex-post contracting, ex-ante agents
pay for a share of the ex-post agents’ investment costs. Taking away con-
trol decreases ex-post incentives which can decrease ex-ante marginal costs
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increasing ex-ante investment incentives.
Investment sequencing also has implications for the optimal allocation
of property rights when assets are substitutes at the margin. The basic
intuition is that in certain situations it may be optimal for ex-post agents to
own more than one substitute asset (contrary to Bel’s (2005) predictions) so
as to decrease their incentives which, in turn, helps encourage the incentive
to invest for the ex-ante investors.
The following example illustrates some of the alternate assumptions of
the model.
Example A group of scientists and a large manufacturer of video game
consoles are collaborating to develop and bring to market a new graphics
processor unit that is to be included in the next generation of consoles. The
two tasks (development of a new graphics processor by the scientists and
the establishment of the production process by the manufacturer) could, un-
der some circumstances be completed at the same time. This would be the
assumption underlying the simultaneous investment (the standard) model.
In this case, each party makes their relationship specific investment (which
is sunk once made) prior to contracting being possible. Once both invest-
ments have been made, the project becomes tangible and the parties can
re-negotiate and determine the distribution of surplus derived from trade.
During re-negotiation the party’s claim on surplus depends, in a large part,
on their ownership of project-critical assets.
Of course, rather than investing in the two tasks at the same time, it could
be the case that the scientific investment must be made first - this situation
could arises when it is not possible to start establishing a manufacturing
process before the exact nature of the graphics processor is known. Here we
have sequential investment, as introduced to the model in this thesis. The
investment process could proceed as follows. The scientists invest in develop-
ing the know-how and technologies required for the new graphics processor
unit. None of these investments could have been adequately described in a
contract ex-ante, but as the research proceeds the exact nature of the pro-
cessor, its specifications and its manufacturing requirements become known
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and verifiable. It is the scientists’ research that makes this possible. They
are now in an environment in which contracting is (at least partly) possible,
so that the manufacturer can write cost sharing arrangements prior to sink-
ing his investments. The manufacture’s investments complete the project
and both parties are in a position to re-negotiate over the distribution of the
gains from trade.
Making investments sequential changes the incentives to make relation-
ship specific investments of both the scientists and the manufacturer. It is
the aim of the following chapters to explore these changes and to illuminate
their interesting consequences for the optimal allocation of property rights.
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature and
Chapter 3 introduces the model and analyses investment incentives when
sequencing is introduced. Chapter 4 presents the main results and Chapter
5 concludes. The proofs are presented in Appendix A.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Introduction
The neoclassical view of the firm has dominated mainstream economic thought
until relatively recently. A firm is characterised by a given production tech-
nology and a profit-maximising entrepreneur who rents resources such as
labour and capital and allocates them to their most efficient uses. The firm
is thus a metaphorical black box because no attention is paid to its internal
structure or organisation. It suffices to derive the firm’s average cost curves
in order to determine its cost minimising level of output and thus its optimal
plant size.
In his famous essay, Coase (1937) argues that this view of the firm is very
limited because optimal plant size does not explain optimal firm size; that
is to say, the neoclassical theory is silent about who should own a firm, how
many plants one firm should own or why there should be firm ownership in
the first place. The neoclassical view does not explain why there are many
firms in an economy instead of one all encompassing conglomerate and why
there are many different ownership structures such as partnerships and large
corporations.
Coase (1937) proposes that firms exists to minimise transaction costs.
His fundamental insight is that the market and the firm are two inherently
different governance structures and that transaction costs differ under the two
structures. He argues that when market transaction costs are high then the
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firm as an alternative becomes efficient. However, increasing the number of
transactions that are carried out inside the firm leads to decreasing efficiency
of the entrepreneur (or owner-manager). According to Coase, a firm grows in
size when the number of transactions it carries out increases. Thus, efficient
firm size is reached when the cost of an additional transaction is less outside
the firm than inside.
Property-rights theory
The there are two key problems with Coase’s (1937) and other transaction
cost based theories1 that the property-rights view of the firm seeks to ad-
dress.2 According to Grossman & Hart (1986) the first deficiency is that in
many situations transaction-cost theory fails to pin down exactly the bound-
aries of the firm because it does not explain exactly what kind of contract
brings a transaction inside a firm (and under the control of the entrepreneur)
and what kind of contract keeps it in the market. The problem is particularly
acute when dealing with labour contracts. For example, transaction-cost the-
ory does not differentiating between independent contractors and employees
when the contractors agree to place their human capital under the direct
supervision of the entrepreneur for some period of time. In response to this
inherent difficulty, Grossman & Hart (1986) argue that it is more practical
to define the firm in terms of the set of productive assets (or physical cap-
ital) that are owned together by one entrepreneur. This shift the view of
the firm away from the number of transactions that are controlled by the
entrepreneur to the number of assets that she owns and controls. From this
perspective the difference between employees and independent contractors is
that employees work with the assets provided by the entrepreneur whereas
the independent contractors work with their own assets.3 When the firm is
1See in particular Williamson (1975), Klein, Crawford & Alchian (1978) and Williamson
(1985).
2See Grossman & Hart (1986), Hart & Moore (1990) and Hart (1995).
3The independent contractors are thus also entrepreneurs in his own right. Slight
difficulty arises when the contractors use their own assets as well as those provided by the
entrepreneur. However, such a situation could then be regarded as a joint venture or some
kind of co-operation agreement.
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defined in terms of asset ownership, it is possible to address the second key
shortcoming of transaction cost based theories.
Modern transaction-cost theory (see for example Williamson (1985)) cen-
tres around investment inefficiencies that arise when trade requires relation-
ship specific investments and contracting through the market is incomplete
or altogether impossible. This situation has become known as the hold-up
problem, the essence of which is that when contracts are incomplete and
all parties anticipate re-negotiation after investments have been sunk then
many agents will invest inefficiently if they expect not to recover the full
marginal benefit of their investment return during re-negotiation (see Grout
(1984)). Transaction-cost theorists argue that when the hold-up problem
becomes too severe then bringing together all transacting parties within the
same firm aligns their incentives so that the hold-up problem can be over-
come. However, as pointed out by Grossman & Hart (1986), transaction cost
theory fails to explain exactly why incentives change when a transaction is
brought inside the firm. They argue that during re-negotiation the bargain-
ing power of the parties (or agents) derives from two distinct sources. If
the value of a transaction depends critically on one agent contributing her
human capital then that agent can threaten to withhold her labour in order
to extort a higher share of the surplus. This source of bargaining power can
not be influenced through integration because a hostile supplier with critical
human capital who negotiates a high supply price for his input will negotiate
an equally high salary if he is to be hired by the entrepreneur.4
However, many transactions do not just depend on human capital but also
require physical assets to generate surplus. In such a situation the owner of
the necessary physical capital has bargaining power because she can threaten
to withhold the assets and use them outside of the relationship instead. Nat-
urally, the higher the value of the assets inside the relationship the greater is
the bargaining power of the owner. Since most physical assets can be traded
freely in the market, integration (of assets) does have a significant impact on
4In the absence of slavery human capital can never be sold in a market, it can at best
be rented for certain periods of time and within narrowly defined contractual boundaries
(job descriptions).
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the nature of the hold-up problem.
The key findings of the property rights theory – Grossman & Hart (1986)
and Hart & Moore (1990) – can be summarised as follows; as the contracting
environment becomes less well defined, the residual rights of control5 over
critical assets become more important in determining the bargaining power
of the agents. Under these conditions firm boundaries (or asset ownership)
are driven to optimise the investment incentives of agents who make rela-
tionship specific investments by protecting them from opportunism when
re-negotiation occurs.
Access, veto and asset relationships
Hart & Moore’s (1990) model is frequently criticised for its broad and unre-
fined use of the term ownership. For example, Demsetz (1996) argues that
residual control rights is an ambiguous concept and that assets have multiple
attributes, each of which can have different owners. Similarly, Rajan & Zin-
gales (1998) contend that a guarantee to freely access and use an asset can be
just as effective and sometimes more effective than the allocation of owner-
ship in overcoming the hold-up problem. Other authors pointed out that the
original property rights model is at best a theory of the entrepreneurial firm
but that it does not fit the picture of large modern-day corporations where
ownership by shareholders is often separated from the day to day control of
managers (Bolton & Scharfstein 1998).6
It follows that a more nuanced definition of property rights is needed
to give a clearer understanding of real-world firm structures. Bel’s (2005)
model unbundles ownership into the right to access an asset and the right to
veto access to an asset.7 Using this refined notion of property rights, he is
not only able to describe modern-day corporations with outside shareholders
5The owner of an asset controls all aspects of its use. He may chose to assign control
rights over certain aspects of the asset’s use to other parties but always retains residual
control over all aspects of the asset’s use which are not subject to any contracts.
6Bolton & Scharfstein (1998) also argue that the property-rights model ignores agency
problems because owners are also managers of the firm.
7Here Bel (2005) uses the properties of ownership – access, withdrawal, management
exclusion and alienation – as defined in Schlager & Ostrom (1992) and groups them into
access and veto.
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and hybrid governance structures such as joint ventures, but he also gives
conditions under which such institutional arrangements can be optimal. This
is a radical departure from the original model by Hart & Moore (1990) where
certain types of joint ownership are explicitly ruled out and outside veto is
disallowed.8
By relaxing the assumption that all assets are complementary at the mar-
gin, Bel (2005) introduces another important innovation into the property-
rights framework. The motivation here is that if the number of assets con-
trolled by an agent increases then her human capital (for example, her man-
agement skills) is spread more thinly across the larger set of assets, which can
reduce her marginal return to investment. This is essentially Coase’s (1937)
idea of diminishing returns to management applied to the property-rights
paradigm.
The possibility to unbundle access and veto rights and to transfer them
separately has far reaching consequences for the optimal allocation of prop-
erty rights because the transfer of ownership alone (i.e., when access and veto
are transferred together) is often too restrictive to solve complex incentive
problems. For example, when all assets are complements Bel (2005) finds
that it is optimal to give all agents access to all assets while veto powers
should be given to none. Thus, there should be a kind of communal access
to common resources, which ensures that the hold-up problem is minimised
because nobody can threaten to withhold assets. Conversely, if all assets
are substitutes at the margin then it is sometimes better for incentives to
allocate more veto powers without allocating more access rights. For exam-
ple consider a situation where an entrepreneur owns two substitute (at the
margin) firms. The entrepreneur would have higher investment incentives
if he could transfer ownership of the firm to someone else but it might be
hard to find a buyer because all other entrepreneurs already own their own
firms and do not wish to take control of a substitute asset. The solution is to
give someone (outside) veto power over one of the firms without giving that
person access. In this way the entrepreneur’s return to investment increases
because he no longer controls a substitute asset and can no longer bring it
8Propositions 3 and 4.
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with him when he trades, but at the same time the incentives of the person
exercising veto are unchanged.
The preceding discussion highlights that the transfer of ownership always
involves a trade-off between the effects of access and veto on investment
incentives. Thus, if access and veto can be transferred separately then the
set of institutional arrangements to overcome incentives problems expands
significantly.
Timing of investment
A related line of enquiry that draws on the insights developed in the incomplete-
contracts literature and focusses on the timing of investments as an institu-
tional arrangement to overcome the hold-up problem when other solutions –
such as transfer of ownership – are unavailable (see Smirnov & Wait (2004a)
and Smirnov & Wait (2004b)).
When the order of investment is given exogenously Smirnov & Wait
(2004b) find that sequential investment improves the incentives of the second
agent. The reason for this effect is that the second agent invests when con-
tracting is possible and is thus not affected by the hold-up problem. However,
the incentives of the first agent are reduced because the sequential invest-
ment regime delays the collection of ex-post returns. For the first agent’s
incentives to be adversely affected a discount factor has to be present in the
model. If future payments are not discounted then the first agent’s incentives
are unaffected but the second agent’s incentives still increase.9
The key insight of the literature on investment timing and hold-up is
that investment incentives can change as a result of factors other than the
re-allocation of property rights, for example by changing model parameters
such as the time frame of investments. The literature also suggests that the
impact of sequencing has an ambiguous effect on incentives, an insight which
is explored further in this thesis.
9See Effects 2 and 3.
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Sequential investment and property rights
The review of the property-rights literature shows that a proper assignment
of access and veto rights can help to alleviate incentive problems when as-
sets are complements or substitutes at the margin. At the same time, it
seems clear that many economic situations require sequential investment.
This means that some agents are more exposed to hold up than others and
rely more heavily on property rights to protect their relationship-specific in-
vestments. Under certain conditions sequencing also introduces a Stackelberg
type interaction between the investor groups which leads to additional affects
on incentives.
In order to deepen our understanding of the property-rights framework
and to better understand the evolution of firm boundaries, it is important
to test the model with new real world modifications. The introduction of in-
vestment sequencing is a highly relevant addition to the model because many
economic relationships (such as research and development) require staged in-
vestments. However, the findings of this thesis not only make an important
contribution to the property rights literature but also help to confirm some
of the findings of the literature on investment timing and hold-up.
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Chapter 3
Model
This chapter draws on the ideas developed in the introduction and the liter-
ature review and formalises a theoretical model capable of analysing the the
impact of investment sequencing on the optimal allocation of property rights
when trade requires ex-ante investments and contracts are incomplete. Sec-
tion 3.1 introduces the concepts of agents and assets and gives a timeline of
the model. Section 3.2 formalises the concept of property rights and section
3.3 defines the value and cost functions and introduces some assumptions.
First-best investment is analysed in section 3.4 and section 3.5 introduces the
bargaining games. Section 3.6 introduces the maximisation problems of the
different types of agents and compares investment incentives under sequential
and simultaneous investment.
3.1 Agents, assets and timing of investments
This section introduces the basic structure and the timeline of the model. The
economy is populated with a finite set of n agents. The grand coalition is
denoted by N and can be divided into two mutually exclusive but collectively
exhaustive subsets Nea and Nep (Nea ∩ Nep = ∅ and Nea ∪ Nep = N), such
that all agents who invest ex-ante (see discussion below) are members of Nea
and all agents who invest ex-post are members of Nep. There are I ex-ante
agents and J ex-post agents. The set of productive assets A contains a finite
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number of m assets.
Simultaneous investment
Traditional two-period property rights-models – this section replicates the
model used by Bel (2005) – feature simultaneous investment by all agents.
By convention the first period t = 1 is referred to as ex-ante and the sec-
ond period t = 2 is referred to as ex-post. Before investments are made
the allocation of property rights is finalised. To ensure the most efficient
allocation of access and veto rights it is assumed that the agents have no
wealth restrictions and that they can use side payments to trade property
rights. The ex-ante period – at t = 1 – represents the investment stage of
the projects before trade can occur and by assumption all agents invest in
this period (i.e., Nea = N and Nep = ∅). At the end of the ex-ante period
all relationship-specific investments have been made, so that all projects (or
trade relationship) become tangible. Income (or surplus) is generated during
the ex-post periods when production and trade occurs.
Ex-ante contracting is incomplete due to the intangible nature of the
projects, which means that at t = 1, agents can not write contracts to govern
their investment costs. Contracting becomes possible at the beginning of
the ex-post period and it is then that bargaining occurs to divide up the
surplus from production and trade. In a situation where ex-ante contracting
is impossible, the agents derive their bargaining power from the set of assets
that they control and from their inalienable human capital. The structure of
Bel’s (2005) model is summarised in Figure 3.1.
Sequential investment
There are two differences between Bel’s (2005) simultaneous-investment model
and the sequential-investment model presented here. (i) Perhaps not surpris-
ingly, the set of agents who invest ex-post is no longer empty (i.e., Nep 6= ∅)
and (ii) ex-post agents invest after the projects become tangible, which means
that they can contract on their investment costs. It is assumed that the sets
Nep and Nea are determined outside of the model. Such a situation could
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arise from the nature of the projects; in some instances it might be neces-
sary that one set of investments precedes another. The sequential investment
model is summarised in Figure 3.2.
666
ex-ante
• property rights
allocated
• N invest
without contracting
• all projects
become tangible
ex-post
• bargaining
over surplus
• production
Figure 3.1: Simultaneous investment
666
ex-ante
• property rights
allocated
• Nea invest
without contracting
• all projects
become tangible
ex-post
• Nep invest
with contracting
• bargaining
over surplus
• production
Figure 3.2: Sequential investment
3.2 Property rights
The model follows Bel (2005) in assuming that asset ownership can be un-
bundled into the right to access an asset and the right to veto access to
an asset. This section formalises the definitions of access, veto and control
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structures and introduces the concept of single, multiple and joint property
rights. The access structure of the economy is defined as follows:
Definition 1. Let the mapping υ from the set of subsets of N to the set of
subsets of A be defined as the access structure of the economy. The mapping
υ satisfies:
υ(S ′) ⊆ υ(S) ∀ S ′ ⊆ S and υ(N) = A (3.1)
Equation (3.1) says that if a sub-coalition accesses an asset then the full
coalition must also access the asset and the grand coalition can access all
assets. The structure of veto rights in the economy is defined in a similar
way:
Definition 2. Let the mapping χ from the set of subsets of N to the set of
subsets of A be defined as the veto structure of the economy. The mapping
χ satisfies:
χ(S ′) ⊆ χ(S) ∀ S ′ ⊆ S and χ(N) = A (3.2)
Equation (3.2) says that if a sub-coalition vetoes an asset then the full
coalition also vetoes the asset and the grand coalition always vetoes all as-
sets. A coalition of agents S is said to control an asset a if and only if no
coalition outside of S has veto over a. The control structure of the economy
is important in determining the investment incentives of the agents because
a coalition can only put an asset to productive use (and derive surplus from
it) if it controls the asset. Formally:
Definition 3. A control structure is a mapping β from the set of subsets of
N to the set of subsets of A, such that β(S) = υ(S)\χ(N\S). The control
structure satisfies:
β(S ′) ⊆ β(S) ∀ S ′ ⊆ S and β(N) = A (3.3)
Types of property rights
There exist different types of access, veto and control rights. For example,
the access rights over an asset ai or group of assets A can be allocated as
follows:
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Single access occurs when only a single agent can access an asset which
implies that only coalitions that include the agent can access the asset
(υ(i) = ai, υ(j) 6= ai, ∀ j 6= i ∈ N).
Multiple access occurs when several agents can access an asset indepen-
dent of each other and any coalition that includes at least one of the
agents can access the asset (υ(i) = ai for some i ∈ N).
Joint access occurs when several agents can access an asset only together
and so only coalitions that include all of the agents can access the asset
(υ(i) = υ(j) = ∅, υ(i, j) = ai and ai ∈ υ(S) ⇐⇒ i, j ∈ S).
Veto rights and control rights follow the same pattern.
3.3 Value and cost functions
Value function
The agents of a coalition use the human and physical capital they control
to engage in economic production in order to generate income (or surplus).
While the specific internal arrangements of a coalition can be complex, the
model defines a value function that gives the maximum surplus achievable by
a particular coalition, conditional upon the assumption that all human and
physical assets are allocated to their most efficient uses. The value function
is thus defined as follows:
Definition 4. Let v(S,A | x) be the value function of a coalition S ⊆ N in
control of the subset of assets A ⊆ A, where x is the vector of investments
by all agents.1
The (maximum) value generated by a coalition S is sensitive to the rela-
tionships (i) between the agents in S, (ii) between the assets controlled by
S and (iii) between the human-capital investments of the agents in S.2 The
model imposes a number of assumptions on these relationships:
1Note that β(S) = A.
2The same holds for the marginal return to investment vi(S,A | x).
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Assumption 1 (Superadditivity of value function). Agents and assets are
always complementary;
i.e., v(S,A | x) ≥ v(S ′, A′ | x) + v(S ′\S,A′\A | x), ∀ S ′ ⊆ S and A′ ⊆ A.
The assumption that all assets are complementary is easily explained
because it is hard to imagine a situation where the total income generated
by a coalition decreases because it controls additional productive assets. The
reason is that, if using these additional assets really decreased overall surplus
then the firm could simply chose to ignore the new assets and produce only
with those assets it had available originally. However, the superadditivity
specification is not about assets alone. It also imposes gains from trade onto
the economy. It says that adding more agents to a coalition is always weakly
beneficial, which implies that the grand coalition will always produce the
largest surplus.
Differentiating the value function with respect to human-capital invest-
ment gives the marginal return to investment of agent i in coalition S for a
given vector of investments x.
∂v(S,A | x)
∂xi
≡ vi(S,A | x) (3.4)
Several assumptions are imposed on the marginal-return function. Assump-
tion 2, says that the addition of an agent to a coalition never decreases the
marginal return to investment of coalition members. If the assumption holds,
then the grand coalition necessarily maximises the return to investment of all
agents in the economy for a given level of human capital investment. While
seemingly a strong assumption it is not very restrictive because the focus of
the thesis lies on asset relationships and investment timing:
Assumption 2. Agents are always complementary at the margin;
i.e., vi(S ′, A) ≤ vi(S,A) ≤ vi(N,A), ∀ i ∈ N, ∀ A ⊆ A, ∀ S ′ ⊆ S ⊆ N .
Assumption 3 specifies that there are diminishing returns to investment.
This is a realistic but largely technical assumption that together with the
functional form of the cost function guarantees a unique profit-maximising
equilibrium. However, concavity also makes intuitive sense. For a given set
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of assets that an agent can work with and for a given set of co-workers,
increasing investment in human capital will always increase productivity but
because the other variables are fixed productivity will increase at a decreasing
rate:
Assumption 3. The value function v(S, β(S) | x) is strictly increasing in xi
and strictly convex;
i.e., vi(S,A | x) > 0 and vii(S,A | x) < 0.
The following two assumptions specify the restrictions that are placed on
the marginal relationships of human-capital investments. Assumption 4 is
a simplifying assumption, used to emphasise that investments are not only
relationship specific but also agent specific. In other words, the term human
capital highlights the fact that the the investments are useless without the
agent who made the investment.
Assumption 4. All investments are in human capital;
i.e., vi(S,A) = 0 when i /∈ S.
Assumption 5 is critical for many results of this thesis. It formalises the
idea that the returns to human capital investments by different agents of
a coalition are interdependent. The assumption suggests that agents who
work with highly productive co-workers also tend to be more productive and
therefore have greater incentives to invest in their own human capital. This
assumption tends to compound the effect of productivity changes on invest-
ment incentives that directly affect only a few agents in the economy because
these effects do not remain isolated. Some authors have placed restrictions on
investment complementarity by assuming that vij(S,A | x) = 0 (see Hart &
Moore (1988)). This restricts the effect of a change in investment on marginal
return to the agent making the investment. This however, abstracts from the
real-world dynamics of economic systems where shocks are rarely isolated to
one coalition or subsection of the economy.
Assumption 5. Investments are strict strategic complements at the margin;
i.e., vij(S,A | x) > 0, ∀ j 6= i ∈ S.
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Cost function
In this economy the opportunity cost of making human capital investment
Ci(xi) has the same unit of measurement as the value function. The model
assumes that the cost function Ci(xi) is twice differentiable as well as strictly
increasing and convex in xi. Thus, the marginal cost of investment is in-
creasing with the level of investment. This is summarised below.
Assumption 6. The cost function Ci(xi) is increasing in xi and concave;
i.e., C ′i(xi) ≥ 0 and C ′′i (xi) ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ N .
3.4 First-best investment
It follows from superadditivity of the value function (Assumption 1) that the
grand coalition N generates the largest surplus for any given level of human
capital investment. The superadditivity assumption says that there are al-
ways gains from trade and that it is never optimal to deny some productive
agents the possibility to trade with each other. The first-best level of invest-
ment is the welfare-maximising level of investment that would be chosen by
a benevolent social planner. Similar to Bel (2005, 8-9) the planner’s problem
is:
max
x
W (x) = v(N,A | x)−
∑
i∈N
Ci(xi) (3.5)
It follows that the welfare-maximising level of human capital investment (the
vector x∗) solves the first-order condition (FOC):
vi(N,A | x∗) = C ′i(x∗i ) ∀ i ∈ N (3.6)
The vector x∗ maximises the surplus of the economy net of the sum of invest-
ment costs and a unique maximum is guaranteed because the value function
of the grand coalition is concave (Assumption 3) and the cost functions of
all agents are convex (Assumption 6).
The first-best investment goals are not necessarily obtainable as the ob-
jectives of the individual agents are not necessarily aligned with those of the
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social planner. Whereas the social planner maximises net social surplus the
agents maximise their net private benefits.
3.5 Bargaining over surplus and costs
In the standard simultaneous investment model the agents bargain over the
allocation of surplus in the ex-post period3 and it is convention to use the
Shapley value as the solution concept. One reason for why the Shapley
value finds widespread application in the property rights literature is that
it guarantees efficient ex-post bargaining. This restriction means that the
possibility of hold-up is the only source of distortions to investment incentives
in the model because a potential second cause of distortions arising from
problems with the bargaining process are assumed away.4 Let Bi be agent
i’s share of gross surplus. Then the following equality must hold:∑
i∈N
Bi(β | x) = v(N,A | x) (3.7)
Equation (3.7) says that the surplus allocated to the agents must sum to
total surplus generated by the grand coalition. Following the convention of
Hart & Moore (1990) the Shapley value Bi is defined as follows:
Definition 5. Agent i’s share of gross surplus Bi is given by the Shapley
value.
Bi(β | x) =
∑
S|i∈S
p(S)[v(S, β(S) | x)− v(S\{i}, β(S\{i}) | x)] (3.8)
where p(S) = (|S|−1)!(|N |−|S|)!
(|N |)! gives the probability that the particular coalition
S occurs.
The possibility of sequential investment introduces a second type of bar-
gaining game. As with the simultaneous case, the agents still bargain over
3Note that all projects are tangible ex-post.
4See (Grossman & Hart 1986) for reasons why the literature focusses on the hold-up
problem rather than ex-post bargaining inefficiencies.
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the division of surplus during the ex-post period but in addition they also
bargain over how to share the investment costs of ex-post agents among
themselves.5
Analogous to the simultaneous case, the representative agent’s share of
gross surplus Bi is given by the Shapley value but now let λ be the set
of exogenously given sharing rules that determine how the costs of ex-post
investments are shared among the agents of the economy. Let λil denote
the proportion of ex-post agent i’s investment cost paid by agent l and let
the set of all sharing rules in the economy be defined as λ = {λil : ∀ i ∈
Nep and ∀ l ∈ N}. A sharing rules must be non-negative and less than or
equal to one (i.e., λil ∈ [0, 1]) and also satisfy the condition
∑
l∈N λil = 1.
Then the following equality holds:∑
l∈N
Bl(β | x)−
∑
i∈Nep
∑
l∈N
λilCi(xi) = v(N,A | x)−
∑
i∈Nep
Ci(xi) (3.9)
Equation (3.9) gives the gross surplus net of all ex-post investment costs. The
set of sharing rules is given exogenously and can be thought of as the closed-
form solution to some cost-sharing bargaining game that is not explicitly
included in the model.6 The cost-sharing rule could be thought to arise
from the relative bargaining strengths of the parties, relating for example to
an extensive-form bargaining game such as Rubinstein (1982) or Binmore,
Rubinstein & Wolinsky (1986).
Making the sharing rule exogenous could be troublesome if the results
were sensitive to the assumption that the sharing rule does not depend on
the allocation of property right. However, this is not the case. The results are
also not sensitive to any particular sharing rule being used or any relationship
between the sharing rule and the Shapley value. The results derive only from
the fact that ex-post investment costs can be shared but it does not matter
how they are shared.
Using the assumption that there are diminishing returns to investment,
5Recall that the agents in Nea invest ex-ante and that the agents in Nep invest ex-post
and that the ex-post agents contract on their investment costs.
6In principle the solution concept of this game could also be the Shapley value.
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that investments are complementary at the margin and that all investments
are in human capital it is possible to characterise the behaviour of marginal
return to investment. From Definition 5 and Assumption 4 it follows that
agent i’s marginal return to investment is given by:
∂Bi(β | x)
∂xi
=
∑
S|i∈S
p(S)vi(S, β(S) | x) (3.10)
It is now convenient to define two matrices W ea and W ep that collect the
second partial derivatives of the Shapley value for all ex-ante agents and
ex-post agents:
W ea =

∂2B1
∂x2ea,1
· · · ∂2B1
∂xea,1∂xea,I
...
. . .
...
∂2BI
∂xea,I∂xea,1
· · · ∂2BI
∂x2ea,I
 W ep =

∂2B1
∂x2ep,1
· · · ∂2B1
∂xep,1∂xep,I
...
. . .
...
∂2BI
∂xep,I∂xep,1
· · · ∂2BI
∂x2ep,I

The elements on the main diagonal of W ea and W ep are all negative be-
cause there are diminishing returns to investment (Assumption 3 and Def-
inition 5 together imply that ∂
2Bl
∂x2l
< 0 ∀ l ∈ N) and all elements off the
main diagonal are all positive because investments are assumed to be strict
strategic complements (Assumption 5 and Definition 5 together imply that
∂2Bl
∂xl∂xk
> 0 ∀ l 6= k ∈ N). In addition, the following assumption is made:
Assumption 7. The matrices W ea and W ep are negative definite.
The matrices W ea and W ep contain the second partial derivatives of the
Shapley value for either ex-ante or ex-post agents. Assuming that they are
negative definite can be justified intuitively. It means that a change in an
agent’s own investment xi has a relatively greater absolute impact on his
marginal return than combined changes to other agents’ investments xl,l 6=i.
In other words, Assumption 7 says that an agent’s marginal return is more
sensitive to changes in his own investment that to changes in other agents’
investments.
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3.6 Maximisation problem
Simultaneous investment
The agents in the economy are self interested and seek to maximise their
ex-post surplus. Under simultaneous investment the first-order conditions of
the agents’ maximisation problems are solved by the equilibrium investment
vector xe. The first-order conditions are given below:
∂Bi(β | xe)
∂xi
=
∂Ci(x
e
i )
∂xi
∀ i ∈ N (3.11)
Condition (3.11) states that in equilibrium, profit-maximising agents set
marginal return to investment equal to marginal cost of investment. It is
the standard maximisation condition of the property-rights literature and all
results derive from it. Note that ∂Bi(β|x
e)
∂xi
≡ ∑S|i∈S p(S)vi(S, β(S) | xe) due
to Definition 5 and Assumption 4. Reallocation of property rights alters the
control structure β and therefore changes marginal return, which will affect
each party’s level of equilibrium investment. The following sections how-
ever, are not concerned with the allocation of property rights but rather take
these as given and discusses the consequences for incentives when sequential
investment is introduced into the economy.
Ex-post investments
The introduction of investment sequencing changes the maximisation prob-
lem of the ex-post agents because ex-post contracting on investments is
possible, reducing their exposure to the hold-up problem by spreading the
costs of their investments. Let ex-ante and ex-post investments be such that
xea ∩ xep = ∅ and xea ∪ xep = x, then (3.12) gives the ex-post agents’ max-
imisation problem:
max
xi
Bi(β | xea, xep)−
∑
k 6=i∈Nep
λkiCk(xep,k)− λiiCi(xep,i) (3.12)
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where the elements of xea are treated as exogenous. The first term from the
left gives agent i’s share of gross surplus and the second term gives i’s share of
other ex-post agents’ investment costs. The term on the right gives i’s own
investment cost and because contracting is allowed, if λii < 1 then i does
not pay the full cost of investment. The vector xeep of ex-post equilibrium
investments then solves the first-order conditions given below:
∂Bi(β | xea, xeep)
∂xep,i
= λii
∂Ci(x
e
ep,i)
∂xep,i
∀ i ∈ Nep (3.13)
where
∂Bi(β|xea,xeep)
∂xep,i
≡∑S|i∈S p(S)vi(S, β(S) | xea, xeep) (using Definition 5 and
Assumption 4). From condition (3.13) it follows that ex-post equilibrium in-
vestment is implied by the exogenous variables, namely the control structure
of the economy β, the set of sharing rules λ and to the level of ex-ante
investment xea. This relationship is formalised in Definition 6:
Definition 6. Let the vector of equilibrium investments be governed by the
implicit function xeep = R(β, λ|xea) such that xeep,i = Ri(β, λ|xea) ∀ i ∈ Nep.
The first point of interest is to characterise the behaviour of equilibrium
ex-post investment when either ex-ante investment changes or when the set
of sharing rules changes. Lemma 1 shows how ex-post investment responds
to changes in ex-ante investment:
Lemma 1. For a given control structure and set of sharing rules, if any ex-
ante agent increases investment then – ceteris paribus – all ex-post agents in-
crease equilibrium investment. I.e,
∂xep,i
∂xea,j
|xep=xeep > 0 ∀ i ∈ Nep and ∀ j ∈ Nea
or equivalently ∂Ri(β,λ|xea)
∂xea,j
> 0 ∀ i ∈ Nep and ∀ j ∈ Nea.
Proof: See Appendix A
The intuition of Lemma 1 is straight forward and depends on the as-
sumption that all investments are strictly complementary. It says that if an
ex-ante agent increases her level of investment then the marginal productivity
of all ex-post agents also increases because the ex-ante agent will be a more
productive co-worker. Ceteris paribus; the increase in marginal productivity
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of the ex-post agents raises their investment incentives and leads to higher
ex-post equilibrium investment.
Consider next the response of ex-post investment to changes in the set of
sharing rules:
Lemma 2. For a given control structure and vector of ex-ante investments,
if λii decreases then – ceteris paribus – all ex-post agents decrease equilibrium
investment; i.e.,
∂xep,i
∂λll
|xep=xeep ≤ 0 ∀ i, l ∈ Nep or equivalently ∂Ri(β,λ|xea)∂λll ≤
0 ∀ i, l ∈ Nep.
Proof: See Appendix A
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is that the investment incentives of ex-
post agents depend – among other things – on their marginal costs. Agent
i’s marginal costs depend on his sharing rule λii, where a value closer to one
means that the agent has higher marginal costs. Thus, a small increase in
his sharing rule decreases his investment incentives and – ceteris paribus –
causes him to invest less in equilibrium. However, Lemma 2 says more; be-
cause investments are complementary the lower equilibrium investment by i
also lowers the marginal productivity (and return) of all other ex-post agents
because he is a less productive co-worker. Thus, decreasing equilibrium in-
vestment of all other ex-post agents. Of course, this effect is reversed if the
sharing rule of the ex-post agent decreases rather than increases.
Ex-ante investments
Consider next the maximisation problem of the ex-ante agents. In contrast to
the ex-post group, the ex-ante agents can not contract on their investment
costs and are thus more exposed to the hold-up problem. Also, the fact
that ex-ante agents sink their investments before ex-post agents make their
investment decisions gives rise to a Stackelberg type strategic interaction if
investments are assumed to be strategic complements.
Recall that ex-post equilibrium investment is implied by the structural
parameters of the economy (such as the control structure and the set of
sharing rules) and the level of ex-ante investment. Ex-ante investors make
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use of this fact by incorporating the (implicit) ex-post reaction functions
R = {Ri : ∀ i ∈ Nep}7 into their maximisation problems. Thus, internalis-
ing the impact on ex-post equilibrium investment due to changes in ex-ante
investment. A representative ex-ante agent j ∈ Nea solves:
max
xj
Bj(β | xea, xeep)−
∑
i∈Nep
λijCi(x
e
ep,i)− Cj(xea,j) (3.14a)
Replacing xeep with R:
max
xj
Bj(β | xea, R)−
∑
i∈Nep
λijCi(Ri)− Cj(xea,j) (3.14b)
Similar to the ex-post maximisation problem, the first term on the left gives
j’s share of gross surplus. Notice that the ex-post equilibrium investments
are endogenous, which is signified by the optimal response function R which
depends on xea (see Definition 6). The term on the far right gives the cost of
investing xea,j in human capital. It is missing a sharing rule because ex-ante
agents can not contract on their investment costs. The summation in the
middle specifies how much of the ex-post investment costs are paid by the
ex-ante agent j (a consequence of the fact that ex-post agents can contract
on their investments).
Remark 1. Ex-post contracting means that ex-ante agents pay for a share of
ex-post investment costs (i.e., the term
∑
i∈Nep λijCi(x
e
ep,i) appears in the ex-
ante maximisation problem (3.14a)) and therefore it is possible that the set
of sharing rules is such that net surplus is negative for some ex-ante agents.
If that is the case then those agents do not invest. While such an outcome
is possible, this thesis assumes that Bj(β | xea, xeep)−
∑
i∈Nep λijCi(x
e
ep,i)−
Cj(xea,j) ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ Nea, thus restricting subsequent analysis on the marginal
impacts of investment sequencing.
Subject to Remark 1, the vector of ex-ante equilibrium investments xeea
7See Definition 6 for details.
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solves the first-order conditions:
∂Bj(β | xeea, R)
∂xea,j
+
∑
i∈Nep
[
∂Bj(β | xeea, R)
∂Ri
− λij ∂Ci(Ri)
∂Ri
]
∂Ri
∂xea,j
=
∂Cj(x
e
ea,j)
∂xea,j
(3.15)
∀ j ∈ Nea, where ∂Bj(β|x
e
ea,R)
∂xea,j
≡ ∑S|j∈S p(S)vj(S, β(S) | xeea, R) (using Defi-
nition 5 and Assumption 4) is simply the marginal return to investment and
∂Cj(x
e
ea,j)
∂xea,j
is the standard marginal cost term. Comparing condition (3.11)
to (3.15) reveals that ex-ante investment incentives change significantly due
to the appearance of
∑
i∈Nep
[
∂Bj(β|xeea,R)
∂Ri
− λij ∂Ci(Ri)∂Ri
]
∂Ri
∂xea,j
. This new term
arises under sequential investment because ex-ante agents internalise the ef-
fect that their investment choices have on ex-post equilibrium investment. It
is therefore convenient to name this term the internalisation effect and to
introduce the following notation in order to simplify the discussion:
Definition 7. Let the internalisation effect be denoted by:
Sj ≡ Sj(β, λ|xea) ≡
∑
i∈Nep
[
∂Bj(β | xeea, R)
∂Ri
− λij ∂Ci(Ri)
∂Ri
]
∂Ri
∂xea,j
∀ j ∈ Nea
From Definition 7 it is immediately clear that the internalisation effect
impacts the ex-ante maximisation problem if and only if ex-post equilibrium
investment is sensitive to changes in ex-ante investment (i.e., iff ∂Ri
∂xea,j
6=
0 ∀ i ∈ Nep and ∀ j ∈ Nea). Given the assumptions on diminishing returns
to investment, investment complementarity and human capital investment
Lemma 1 showed that ∂Ri
∂xea,j
> 0 ∀ i ∈ Nep and ∀ j ∈ Nea and therefore the
internalisation effect impacts on ex-ante investment incentives.
The internalisation effect can be broken up into two parts. The term∑
i∈Nep
∂Bj(β|xeea,R)
∂Ri
∂Ri
∂xea,j
denotes the impact of the internalisation effect on
ex-ante marginal return to investment. It captures the fact that an increase
in ex-ante investment raises ex-post equilibrium investment which has two
opposing effect. On the one hand, higher ex-post investment makes all ex-
post agents more productive increasing gross surplus, which in turn raises ex-
ante marginal return to investment. But on the other hand, more productive
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ex-post agents demand a greater share of gross surplus, which reduces ex-
ante marginal return. Thus, it is ambiguous whether the internalisation effect
increases or decreases marginal return.8
The term
∑
i∈Nep λij
∂Ci(Ri)
∂Ri
∂Ri
∂xea,j
denotes the impact of the internalisation
effect on ex-ante marginal costs. It captures the fact that an increase in
ex-ante investment not only raises ex-post equilibrium investment but also
ex-post investment costs. As a consequence of ex-post contracting ex-ante
investors share some of the ex-post investment costs, which means that an
increase in ex-ante investment leads to an increase in ex-ante costs. It follows
that the internalisation effect always increases ex-ante marginal costs.
The thesis assumes that the impact of internalisation on ex-ante invest-
ment incentives is independent of the level of ex-ante investment. In other
words, the change in ex-ante marginal return and costs that occurs because
ex-ante agents internalise the effect of their investment choice on ex-post
equilibrium investment stays constant at any level of ex-ante investment.
While this is a reasonable assumption to make it also makes the analysis
more tractable when changes in the control structure are examined in Chap-
ter 4. However, relaxation of Assumption 8 could be a fruitful avenue of
future research.
Assumption 8. The internalisation effect is independent of the level of ex-
ante investment; i.e.,
∂Sj
∂xea,l
= 0 ∀ j, l ∈ Nea.
The preceding discussion makes clear that it is not possible to determine
the sign of the of the internalisation effect without imposing further assump-
tions on investment relationships. This makes it difficult to compare ex-ante
(and ex-post) equilibrium investment under the simultaneous and sequential
regimes. However, it is possible to characterise the response of ex-ante equi-
librium investment to a change in the internalisation effect. Lemma 3 does
exactly that:
8To see this more clearly; use Definition 5 to get
∑
i∈Nep
∂Bj(β|xeea,R)
∂Ri
∂Ri
∂xea,j
=∑
i∈Nep
[∑
S|j∈S
[
vi(S, β(S)|xea, R)− vi(S\{j}, β(S\{j})|xea, R)
]]
∂Ri
∂xea,j
. By Assump-
tion 6 vi(S, β(S)|xea, R) > 0 and vi(S\{j}, β(S\{j})|xea, R) > 0 which means that the
sign of the internalisation effect on marginal return is ambiguous.
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Lemma 3. For a given control structure; if the internalisation effect in-
creases for any ex-ante agent then – ceteris paribus – all ex-ante agents in-
crease their equilibrium investments; i.e.,
∂xea,j
∂Sl
|xea=xeea > 0 ∀ j, l ∈ Nea
Proof: See Appendix A
Lemma 3 says that if the equilibrium value of the internalisation effect
of any ex-ante agent changes such that marginal return increases relative to
marginal costs, then all ex-ante agents have higher investment incentives.
The reason is that the incentive to invest increases for the first agent, which
causes her to invest more. Her higher level of investment makes her a more
productive co-worker which, in turn, increases the marginal return and equi-
librium investment of all other ex-ante agents.
So far it was shown that investment incentive of ex-post agents rise if
ex-ante agents invest more and if ex-post agents pay for a smaller share of
their investment costs. With regards to ex-ante agents it was shown that
if the internalisation effect increases then ex-ante investment incentives rise.
These insights are now combined to show that ex-ante investment incentives
can rise as a consequence of investment sequencing and that the response of
ex-post incentives depends partially on the response of ex-ante incentives:
Proposition 1. For a given control structure; (i) if sequential investment
is introduced then the response of ex-ante equilibrium investment is ambigu-
ous; (ii) if at least one ex-ante agent increases equilibrium investment an
no ex-ante agents decrease equilibrium investment then ex-post equilibrium
investment always increases; however, (iii) if some ex-ante agents decrease
equilibrium investment then the response of ex-post equilibrium investment to
the introduction of sequential investment is ambiguous.
Proof: See Appendix A
Proposition 1 summarise the impact on investment incentives and equi-
librium investment when sequential investment is introduced and ex-post
contracting on investment costs is allowed. While the proposition does not
give conditions for the behaviour of ex-ante investment, it does highlight
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the fact that ex-ante equilibrium investment can increase when a sequential
regime is introduced.
At this stage it is interesting to compare the results from this chapter to
the results from the literature on investment timing and hold-up. Consider
for example Smirnov & Wait (2004b) who analyse a buyer-seller scenario
where the seller faces the prospect of hold-up because trade requires sig-
nificant relationship specific investments. They find that when the seller is
allowed to invest second (ex-post) and contract on her investment costs then
she is no longer held up and has a greater incentive to invest. This result
is analogous to Lemma 2, which stated that if an ex-post agent can share a
larger proportion of his investment costs then – ceteris paribus – his invest-
ment incentives rise. Smirnov & Wait (2004b) also find that the incentives
of the ex-ante agent decrease as a result of sequencing. But, this is a conse-
quence of their discount factor, which when set to one (no discounting) makes
ex-ante investment incentives neutral to the introduction of sequential invest-
ment. The reason is that their Assumption 2 sets the internalisation effect to
zero which removes the interdependence of ex-ante and ex-post investment
from their model.
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Chapter 4
Main Results and Discussion
The aim of the following section is to develop a deeper understanding of the
optimal allocation of property rights when trade requires sequential invest-
ments and ex-ante contracting is incomplete.
A key insight of Bel (2005) is that the response of investment incentives to
a change in the allocation of property rights is sensitive to the asset relation-
ships in the economy. For example, if two assets are always complementary
at the margin, the marginal return to investment of all agents in a coali-
tion increases if the coalition controls both assets together instead of only
one. The intuition is that certain assets impose positive externalities on each
other when they are controlled together, which raises the return generated
by an additional unit of human capital investment. Section 4.1 analyses the
behaviour of incentives when all assets are complementary at the margin.
However, if two assets are substitutes at the margin then the marginal
return to investment of all agents in a coalition decreases if it controls the
assets together. Bel (2005) argues that substitution at the margin occurs fre-
quently because if two assets are controlled together then the human capital
of the agent(s) is spread more thin, which can decrease production efficiency
and lower the return generated by an additional unit of human capital in-
vestment. Section 4.2 considers the case where all assets are substitutes at
the margin.
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4.1 All assets are complementary at the mar-
gin
In the following discussion all assets are assumed to be complementary at
the margin. This is clearly a strong assumption but it serves the purpose
of isolating the behaviour of investment incentives when complementary as-
sets (or firms) are integrated or separated. This section tests Bel’s (2005)
optimality conditions derived under simultaneous investment and suggests
modifications where necessary. Assumption 9 formalises the concept of asset
complementarity:
Assumption 9. All assets are complementary at the margin; i.e., vi(S,A|x) ≥
vi(S,A′|x), ∀ i ∈ S ⊆ N and A′ ⊆ A.
4.1.1 Simultaneous investment
In order to contrast the behaviour of incentives under the sequential invest-
ment regime to the simultaneous case it is necessary to first give an overview
of Bel’s (2005) results. When all assets are complementary at the margin he
finds that property rights are assigned optimally if each agent individually
accesses all the assets while only the agents of the grand coalition jointly veto
all assets. Formally: υ(i) = A,χ(i) = ∅, ∀ i ∈ N and χ(N) = A. Allocating
access and veto rights in this way means that the control structure is highly
inclusive because every agent controls every assets. This observation leads
to the following definition:
Definition 8. Control structure β is said to be more inclusive than control
structure β′ if and only if β′(S) ⊆ β(S), ∀ S ⊂ N and β′(S) ⊂ β(S), for
at least one S ⊂ N . Conversely, control structure β′ is said to be more
exclusive than control structure β if and only if β′(S) ⊆ β(S), ∀ S ⊂ N and
β′(S) ⊂ β(S), for at least one S ⊂ N .1
1This definition reflects the fact that the grand coalition always controls all assets and
can not be made more inclusive or exclusive.
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Definition 8 can be interpreted as follows; if either the set of assets con-
trolled by some coalitions increase or if the number of coalitions who control
some set of assets increases – ceteris paribus – the control structure is said
to be more inclusive. Conversely, if the set of assets controlled by some
coalitions decreases or if the number of coalitions who control some set of
assets decreases – ceteris paribus – the control structure is said to be more
exclusive.
Bel’s (2005) result can be characterised in terms of Definition 8. Thus,
under simultaneous investment the most inclusive control structure is optimal
if all assets are complementary at the margin. To better understand the
intuition behind this result, recall the example developed in the introduction.
The set of assets could be thought of as the physical assets of the development
project, such as processor prototypes and detailed construction plans. Then,
in order to minimise the chance of hold-up it would be optimal to give both
the scientists and the console manufacturer joint control (creating a joint
venture) over the physical assets2 of the project because doing so prevents
either party from threatening to withhold critical assets.
It is interesting to note that the two property rights access and veto
have conflicting effects on the control structure. Allocating access rights is
said to be inclusive because increasing the number of assets accessed by a
coalition potentially increases the number assets it controls without affecting
the control rights of other coalitions. The allocation of veto rights on the
other hand is said to be exclusive because increasing the number of assets
vetoed by a coalition has no effect on the number of assets it controls but it
potentially reduces the number of assets controlled by other coalitions.
4.1.2 Sequential investment
The introduction of sequential investment changes the incentives of both ex-
ante and ex-post agents. It was shown in Lemmas 1 and 2 that although the
incentives of ex-post agents benefit from ex-post contracting on investment
costs, their incentives are nevertheless sensitive to the level investment of ex-
2Recall that human capital is inalienable.
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ante agents when investments are complementary. The incentives of ex-ante
investors on the other hand are changed because of the internalisation effect.
As shown by Lemma 3 this effect can increase or decrease their incentives.
Investments are neutral at the margin
The internalisation effect on ex-ante incentive is only significant if Assump-
tion 5 holds because ex-post investment must be sensitive to changes in
ex-ante investment if ex-ante agents are to internalise the impact of their
investment choices.
However, investment incentives do not change only as a result of the in-
ternalisation effect. In fact, the introduction of investment sequencing brings
with it ex-post contracting, which changes ex-post incentives. By replacing
Assumption 5, with Assumption 10 it is possible to isolate the impact of
ex-post contracting on investment incentives and to determine whether the
optimal allocation of property rights changes as a result of ex-post contract-
ing only.
Assumption 10. Investments are neither complements nor substitutes;
i.e., vij(S,A | x) = 0, ∀ j 6= i ∈ N .
When Assumption 10 replaces Assumption 5 then Lemma 1 no longer
holds.3 It follows that the internalisation effect drops out of the ex-ante
first-order conditions:
∂Bj(β | xeea,j, x−j)
∂xea,j
=
∂Cj(x
e
ea,j)
∂xea,j
∀ j ∈ Nea (4.1)
where the vector x−j contains the exogenous investments of the other agents.
Furthermore, because Assumption 10 holds, the marginal return of an agent
j is independent of all other investments by agents l 6= j, which means that
the maximisation problem of each ex-ante agent can be analysed individually.
3To verify, apply Assumption 10 rather than 5 to equation (A.5) in the proof of Lemma
1 to get ∂xep,i∂xea,j = 0.
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The same reasoning applies to the ex-post maximisation problem:
∂Bi(β | xep,i, x−i)
∂xep,i
= λii
∂Ci(x
e
ep,i)
∂xep,i
∀ i ∈ Nep (4.2)
where the vector x−i contains the exogenous investments of the other agents
and the sharing rule λii appears because of ex-post contracting.
The following proposition summarises the impact of a more inclusive con-
trol structure on investment incentives when Assumption 10 holds and all
assets are complementary at the margin:
Proposition 2. If all assets are complementary but human capital invest-
ments are neutral at the margin then the optimal control structure is the most
inclusive control structure.
Proof: See Appendix A
Proposition 2 is an important result because it shows that ex-post con-
tracting alone does not change the optimal allocation of property rights. In
other words, Bel’s (2005) result still holds when investments are independent
despite the introduction of sequential investment. However, Assumption 10
is restrictive because it removes all positive externalities of human capital
investment from the model.
Investments are complementary at the margin
This section reintroduces investment complementarity; that is, Assumption 5
replaces Assumption 10. As a result, Lemma 1 holds and the internalisation
effect on ex-ante incentives reappears.
Once again it is possible to solve the investment game backwards. For this
purpose, consider Lemma 4. It characterises the change of ex-post investment
incentives when the control structure becomes more inclusive:
Lemma 4. If all assets are complementary at the margin and the control
structure becomes more inclusive then – ceteris paribus – ex-post investment
incentives and ex-post equilibrium investments increase; i.e., R(β, λ|xea) ≥
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R(β′, λ|xea), if β is more inclusive than β′.
Proof: See Appendix A
Holding ex-ante investment constant, Lemma 4 says that when all assets
are complementary at the margin and the control structure becomes more
inclusive such that at least one coalition containing ex-post agents controls
a larger set of assets then all ex-post agents have higher marginal return
to investment and invest more in equilibrium. The intuition is that all ex-
post agents who are part of coalitions that control larger sets of assets have
a higher return to investment and increase equilibrium investment, which
also increases the marginal return of all other ex-post agents because higher
investment has positive externalities for other agents (i.e., investments are
complementary).4 The converse it is also true; if the control structure be-
comes more exclusive then ex-post incentives fall.
In contrast to the ex-post group, ex-ante investors do not contract on in-
vestment costs but internalise their effect on ex-post incentives when making
their investment choices. Using Definition 7, the ex-ante first-order condi-
tions are given by:
∂Bj(β | xea, R)
∂xea,j
+ Sj(β, λ|xea)− ∂Cj(xea,j)
∂xea,j
|xea=xeea = 0 ∀ j ∈ Nea (4.3)
The key insight of conditions (4.3) is that ex-ante agents increase their invest-
ment until marginal return equals marginal costs, while taking into account
the impact of their investment choices on the investment incentives of ex-post
investors because the response of ex-post investment affects ex-ante surplus
and costs. A more detailed discussion of the intuition underlying conditions
(4.3) is given in Section 3.6.
It was shown previously that ex-post investment incentives increase when
the control structure becomes more inclusive (Lemma 4). Making use of this
insight, it is possible to show that, contrary to Bel’s (2005) result (derived
4Lemma 4 extends the results of Lemmas 1 and 2, which show that ex-post incentives
increase when either ex-ante investment rises or ex-post agents pay a smaller share of their
investment costs.
38
under simultaneous investment), ex-ante equilibrium investment can in fact
decrease when the control structure becomes more inclusive. Proposition 3
formalises this result:
Proposition 3. If all assets are complementary at the margin and the control
structure becomes more inclusive then ex-ante investment incentives and equi-
librium investment can decrease; i.e., it is possible that xeea,j(β) ≤ xeea,j(β′)
for some or all i ∈ Nea, if β is more inclusive than β.
Proof: See Appendix A
The intuition underlying Proposition 3 is the following; it was shown in
Lemma 4 that a more inclusive control structure increases ex-post invest-
ment incentives, meaning that for a given level of ex-ante investment all
ex-post agents invest more in equilibrium. Increased investment of course
means that investment costs are higher and since the cost function is con-
vex this implies that ex-post marginal costs are also higher for any given
level of ex-ante investment. Further, ex-ante agents internalise the response
of ex-post equilibrium investment to changes in ex-ante investment, which
means that when an ex-ante agents considers whether to invest more, they
take into account that an increase in ex-ante investment not only raises ex-
post investment but also ex-post investment costs of which they pay a share.
This gives the following situation; under a more inclusive control structure
ex-post marginal costs are higher, which means that ex-post costs increase
faster for a given increase in ex-ante investment relative to a more exclu-
sive control structure. In other words, the marginal costs of ex-ante agents
have increased. Finally, if the increase in ex-ante marginal costs described
above, is greater than the increase in ex-ante marginal return (brought about
by the more inclusive control structure) then ex-ante investment incentives
and equilibrium investment can decrease when the control structure becomes
more inclusive.
The example developed in the introduction is useful to further illumi-
nate the intuition of Proposition 3. Recall that a group of scientists and
a large video games console manufacturer are collaborating on a joint re-
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search project. Suppose now that property rights are re-allocated so that
some critical assets that were previously under the control of the scientists
are now controlled jointly (i.e., a more inclusive control structure is imple-
mented). This clearly increases the incentives of the manufacturer because
the scientists can no longer threaten to withhold theses assets. However,
this change has potentially made investment more costly for the scientists
because they realise that every extra dollar they invest into the project will
increase the value of the manufacturer’s investment by more than previously.
It also increases their share of the manufacturer’s investment costs by more
than previously. If this negative effect dominates the positive effect on their
marginal return then a more inclusive control structure can be bad for the
investment incentives of the scientists and for welfare.
4.1.3 Protecting ex-ante incentives
A control structure can be made more inclusive by re-allocating property
rights so that some coalitions control larger sets of assets while taking care
that no coalitions control smaller sets of assets. It is clear that this can
be achieved in different ways. For example, it is possible to target certain
subsets of agents with a more inclusive (or exclusive) control structure while
not affecting others.
Proposition 3 showed that a more inclusive control structure can lower
investment incentives of ex-ante agents. However, so far conditions are miss-
ing that define when ex-ante incentives are likely to rise or fall when the
control structure changes. The question arises naturally, whether targeting
either ex-ante or ex-post agents with a more inclusive control structure has
different consequences for ex-ante investment incentives. Proposition 4 gives
an interesting result:
Proposition 4. A more inclusive control structure targeted only at ex-post
agents is more likely to decrease ex-ante incentives than a more inclusive
control structure targeted at both investor groups.
Proof: See Appendix A
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This is an interesting result because it contradicts Bel (2005) who finds
no such effect when investments are simultaneous. The intuition underlying
Proposition 4 is straight forward. When a more inclusive control structure
is targeted only at ex-post agents then there is no direct change of ex-ante
marginal return because, by assumption, all coalitions containing ex-ante in-
vestors control the same set of assets. However, ex-ante marginal return may
still increase, since ex-ante investors anticipate the improved incentives of
the ex-post parties (some of whom are their colleagues), who invest more for
a given level of ex-ante investment. The internalisation effect also increases
ex-ante marginal costs, because ex-ante investors anticipate an increase in
ex-post costs marginal costs of which they pay a share, this in turn reduces
incentives. Thus, when control becomes more inclusive without directly af-
fecting ex-ante parties and any increase in ex-ante marginal return occurs
because of the anticipated increase in ex-post investment then the increase
in marginal costs is relatively more important and has a stronger negative
impact on investment incentives, which makes it more likely that ex-ante
incentives fall.
The proposition also has empirical implications. In situations where
the ex-post investor (such as the console manufacturer) has fast increas-
ing (highly convex) marginal investment costs, it is expected that the set of
assets controlled by the ex-post investor is relatively small, which is done to
protect the ex-ante investor from the fast increasing ex-post marginal invest-
ment costs. However, there is a trade-off involved. Protection of the ex-ante
investor leaves the ex-post investor highly exposed to hold-up, which reduces
his incentives (something that it is meant to do) but if the investment of the
ex-post investor is critical to the success of the project then this may not be
optimal. Thus, in order to determine whether more protection of the ex-ante
investor is warranted, it is crucial to determine which agent’s investment is
more important to the project.
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4.2 All assets are substitutes at the margin
This section discusses the impact on the optimal allocation of property rights
when sequential investment is introduced into an economy where all assets
are substitutes at the margin in absence of some agents. This restriction on
asset relationships is formalised below:
Assumption 11. All assets are substitutes at the margin in absence of
some agents in N; i.e., vi(S,A|x) ≤ vi(S,A′|x) ∀ i ∈ S ⊂ N and A′(6= ∅) ⊆ A
(vi(S,A) ≥ vi(S, ∅) ∀ i ∈ S ⊆ N).
Assumption 11 says that increasing the set of assets controlled by any
coalition S that is smaller than the grand coalition decreases the marginal
return of all agents in S.5
The focus of this section lies on one of Bel’s (2005) seemingly trivial
results. He shows that when Assumption 11 holds and if the optimal control
structure is given by β∗ then any agent either controls no assets individually
or exactly one asset individually but never more than one. Formally, |β∗(i)| =
1 ∀ i ∈ N1 and |β∗(i)| = 0 ∀ i ∈ N0.6 The intuition for this result works by
contradiction. Suppose that βˆ is the optimal control structure, it is similar
to β∗ in all respects except that it has |βˆ(i)| = 2 for one agent i ∈ N (i.e.,
one of the agents controls two assets rather than only one). Because assets
are substitutes at the margin it is possible to increase this agent’s marginal
return to investment and investment incentives by giving veto rights to one of
his assets to an outside party. This not only increases the agent’s marginal
return to investment when he produces alone (vi(i, {a, b}) ≤ vi(i, a) and
vi(i, {a, b}) ≤ vi(i, b)) but it also increases his marginal return in all coalitions
that he is a member of because he no longer contributes the substitute asset.
Therefore, βˆ can not be optimal.7
The optimality conditions change when sequential investment is intro-
duced, because contrary to Bel (2005), it may be optimal for some ex-post
5The grand coalition N always controls all assets β(N) = A and therefore no assets
can be added to the set controlled by the grand coalition.
6Where N1 ∩N0 = ∅ and N1 ∪N0 = N .
7This paragraph is not meant to replicate Bel’s (2005) proof. See his Proposition 3 for
more details.
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agents to control more than one asset:
Proposition 5. When all assets are substitutes at the margin, ex-ante and
ex-post equilibrium investment can increase if some ex-post agent individually
controls two assets rather than one.
Proof: See Appendix A
The intuition for this result is that if control of a second substitute asset
is given to an ex-post agent then ex-post investment incentives fall, which
means that for a given level of ex-ante investment ex-post equilibrium in-
vestment is lower. By familiar argument, this has two implications for ex-
ante investors. On the one hand, lower ex-post incentives decrease ex-ante
marginal return as a consequence of the internalisation effect. But on the
other hand, the internalisation effect also decreases ex-ante marginal costs
because ex-post marginal costs are lower for a given level of ex-ante invest-
ment. Thus, if the decrease in marginal costs is greater than the decrease in
marginal return, then ex-ante investment incentives can increase. In other
words, sometimes it can be optimal to decrease ex-post incentives by making
control more inclusive for ex-post agents in order to foster ex-ante investment.
Using the example from the introduction it is possible to develop this
result more clearly. Start by assuming that both the group of scientists
and the console manufacturer control a set of complementary assets that
they require to work on the project.8 Suppose that one of the scientists’
assets is a large testing laboratory and that the manufacturer also controls a
similar facility. If joint control of the scientists’ laboratory is given to both
parties then assume that the laboratory acts as a substitute to the set of
assets already controlled by the manufacturer, which has the consequence of
reducing the manufacturer’s marginal return to investment. The incentives
of the scientists can increase as a result because the manufacturer invests
less for a given level of the scientists’ investment, which, in addition, means
that scientists have lower marginal costs (recall that the manufacturer can
write a cost sharing contract). Thus, in situations where the incentives of
8These assets could be thought of as research labs, supercomputers or training facilities.
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the scientists are very sensitive to the manufacturers marginal costs, it might
be optimal to transfer control of a substitute asset to the manufacturer in
order to decrease its incentives.
Proposition 5 provides an interesting contrast to Proposition 4; when all
assets are complementary it may be optimal to take control away from ex-post
agents in order to protect ex-ante investment but when assets are substitutes
it may be optimal to give ex-post agents more control in order to protect
ex-ante investments. Both findings contradict the results derived by Bel
(2005) under simultaneous investment, demonstrating that the introduction
of sequential investment is an important extension of the property rights
framework.
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Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
The property-rights theory of the firm developed by Hart & Moore (1990),
and its many refinements such as Bel (2005)), has made an invaluable con-
tribution to the understanding of organisational forms and firm boundaries
when relationship specific investments are subject to the hold-up problem.
The theory finds widespread application in many economic contexts, such as
the design of financial structures and take-over analysis (Hart 1995).
This thesis extends the scope of the property-rights framework even fur-
ther by examining its predictions when sequencing of investments is allowed.
Sequential investment is particularly important during research and develop-
ment projects where a group of firms (or scientists) must collaborate in order
to develop new technologies. It is often not possible for all parties to work
on a project simultaneously because the nature of research is that progress
builds on the findings of others. Consequently it of great importance to pro-
tect the incentives of agents who are early contributors to a project when the
contracting environment is less complete.
The introduction of sequencing has a number of implications for incen-
tives. When investment is sequential ex-ante investors anticipate the impact
of their investment choices on ex-post investment which in turn influences ex-
ante marginal return (by changing total surplus and by changing the surplus-
share of ex-post agents) and marginal costs (by changing ex-post investment
costs). This is the internalisation effect, which is only present when invest-
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ments of ex-ante and ex-post parties are interdependent.
Perhaps the most important result is that when all assets are complemen-
tary at the margin, investment sequencing can mean that a common access
(or ownership) structure is not optimal to protect ex-ante incentives. This
can occur for example when the ex-post party to a project has fast increasing
marginal costs, making it beneficial for the ex-ante investors to re-allocate
property rights such that ex-post investment for a given level of ex-ante in-
vestment decreases. The implication is that it is not always necessary to
look for asset substitutability in order to explain less inclusive ownership
structures.
Another original finding suggests that when all assets are substitutes it
may strengthen incentives of ex-ante parties to a project when ownership of
substitute assets is transferred to ex-post parties in order to decrease their
investment incentives, in turn lowering their marginal costs. This has further
implications for optimal ownership, suggesting that under certain conditions
assets substitutability can be the driver for more inclusive ownership struc-
tures.
The internalisation effect is not well behaved because no assumptions
have been imposed on the relative changes of total surplus and the surplus-
share of ex-post agents. However, in future applications it may be fruitful to
restrict the behaviour of this effect so that the response of ex-ante investment
to changes in the control structure can be clarified.
The current analyses focusses only on the two extreme cases where all
assets are either complements or substitutes at the margin but neglects the
general case where some assets are substitutes and some are complements.
Bel (2005) finds that the general case provides a rich set of optimality con-
ditions for many different organisational forms such as joint ventures and
outside shareholding. It is therefore likely that the interaction of sequential
investment and general asset relationships would provide interesting auxiliary
results.
The literature on investment timing and hold-up derives several inter-
esting results when discounting of future returns matters (Smirnov & Wait
2004a). It remains to be seen whether the current model could benefit from
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the introduction of discounting but it is clear that any such modification
would have to weigh up its benefits and costs. On the one hand the pres-
ence of discounting would increase the number of interactions in the model,
which may uncover previously hidden implications for property rights. But
at the same time, the model would lose some of its clarity and it may become
impossible to separate some of the effects.
As an empirical application of the framework developed here it would be
interesting to analyse the the ownership structures of real world collaborative
research and development projects in order to determine whether the timing
of major investments influences the ownership structure of the projects as
predicted by this thesis.1
1It is common practice for large infrastructure projects to combine the research exper-
tise of several industrial companies. One such example is the German ICE high speed
train project where the Canadian train manufacturer Bombardier is collaborating with
the German industrial conglomerate Siemens.
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Appendix A
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
The Nash equilibrium ex-post investments xeep are characterised by (3.13)
∂Bi(β | xea, xep)
∂xep,i
− λii∂Ci(xep,i)
∂xep,i
|xep=xeep = 0 i ∈ Nep.
Totally differentiating the above gives
J ep

dxep,1
...
dxep,I
 =

−∑j∈Nea ∂2B1∂xep,1∂xea,j dxea,j
...
−∑j∈Nea ∂2BI∂xep,I∂xea,j dxea,j
+

∂C1
∂xep,1
dλ11
...
∂CI
∂xep,I
dλII
 (A.1)
where J ep is the Jacobian matrix
J ep = W ep +

− ∂2C1
∂x2ep,1
· · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · − ∂2CI
∂x2ep,I
 . (A.2)
By Assumption 7 W ep is a negative definite matrix. It follows that J ep is
also a negative definite. Thus, J ep is invertible. Pre-multiplying both sides
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of (A.1) by the inverse Jacobian J−1ep gives
dxep,1
...
dxep,I
 = J−1ep

−∑j∈Nea ∂2B1∂xep,1∂xea,j dxea,j + ∂C1∂xep,1dλ11
...
−∑j∈Nea ∂2BI∂xep,I∂xea,j dxea,j + ∂CI∂xep,I dλII
 . (A.3)
Set dxea,k = 0 ∀ k 6= j ∈ Nea and dλii = 0 ∀ i ∈ Nep. Dividing both sides by
dxea,j gives
1 
∂xep,1
∂xea,j
...
∂xep,I
∂xea,j
 = J−1ep

∂2B1
∂xep,1∂xea,j
dxea,j
...
∂2BI
∂xep,I∂xea,j
dxea,j
 (A.4)
Then, the response of ex-post agent i’s equilibrium investment to a small
change in investment of ex-ante agent j ∈ Nea is given by
∂xep,i
∂xea,j
=
∑
k∈Nep
Cki
|J ep|
(
− ∂
2Bk
∂xep,k∂xea,j
)
∀ i ∈ Nep and ∀ j ∈ Nea (A.5)
where |J ep| is the determinant and Cki is the cofactor of element cki in J ep.
Recall that J ep is negative definite, which means that its inverse J
−1
ep is non-
positive. It follows that Cki|Jep| < 0 ∀ k, i ∈ Nep. Also, by Definition 5 and
Assumption 5 ∂
2Bk
∂xep,k∂xea,j
> 0 ∀ k ∈ Nep and j ∈ Nea. The right hand side
of (A.5) must therefore be positive (i.e.,
∂xep,i
∂xea,j
> 0). Hence, an increase in
investment by any ex-ante agent increases ex-post equilibrium investment of
all ex-post agents. Q.E.D.
1Here use is made of the fact that dxep,idxea,j must be interpreted as the partial derivative
∂xep,i
∂xea,j
because dxea,k = 0 ∀ k 6= j ∈ Nea.
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Proof of Lemma 2
The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1. Starting from (A.1) set dxea,j =
0 ∀ j ∈ Nea and pre-multiply both sides with J−1ep to get
dxep,1
...
dxep,I
 = J−1ep

∂C1
∂xep,1
dλ11
...
∂CI
∂xep,I
dλII
 . (A.6)
Then, for agent i ∈ Nep the response of equilibrium investment to small
changes in the set of sharing rules is given by
dxep,i =
∑
k∈Nep
Cki
|J ep|
∂Ck
∂xep,k
dλkk ∀ i ∈ Nep. (A.7)
Now, setting dλkk = 0 ∀ k 6= l ∈ Nep and dividing both sides by dλll gives
∂xep,i
∂λll
=
Cli
|J ep|
∂Cl
∂xep,l
∀ i, l ∈ Nep. (A.8)
Analogous to the proof of Lemma 1, it must be that Cli|Jep| < 0 ∀ l, i ∈ Nep.
Also by Assumption 6 it must be that ∂Cl
∂xep,l
≥ 0 ∀ l ∈ Nep. It follows
that the right hand side of (A.8) is non-positive (i.e.,
∂xep,i
∂λll
≤ 0). Hence,
an increase in the share of investment costs payable by any ex-post agent
decreases equilibrium investment of all ex-post agents. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3
The Nash equilibrium ex-ante investments xeea are characterised by (3.15)
∂Bj(β | xea, R)
∂xea,j
+ Sj − ∂Cj(xea,j)
∂xea,j
|xea=xeea = 0 ∀ j ∈ Nea.
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Totally differentiating the above and rearranging gives[
∂2B1
∂x2ea,1
− ∂
2C1
∂x2ea,1
]
dxea,1 +
∑
k 6=1∈Nea
∂2B1
∂xea,1∂xea,k
dxea,k = −dS1
· · ·[
∂2BJ
∂x2ea,J
− ∂
2CJ
∂x2ea,J
]
dxea,J +
∑
k 6=J∈Nea
∂2BJ
∂xea,J∂xea,k
dxea,k = −dSJ
or in matrix notation
J ea

dxea,1
...
dxea,J
 =

−dS1
...
−dSJ
 (A.9)
where Jea is the Jacobian matrix
J ea = W ea +

− ∂2C1
∂x2ea,1
· · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · − ∂2CI
∂x2ea,I
 . (A.10)
By Assumption 7 W ea is a negative definite matrix, which implies that J ea
is also negative definite and invertible. Then, pre-multiplying both sides of
(A.9) by the inverse Jacobian J−1ea gives
dxea,1
...
dxea,J
 = J−1ea

−dS1
...
−dSJ
 . (A.11)
Then, for agent j ∈ Nea the response of equilibrium investment to small
changes in the internalisation effect of all ex-ante agents is given by
dxea,j =
∑
k∈Nep
Ckj
|J ea|(−dSk) ∀ j ∈ Nea (A.12)
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where |J ea| is the determinant and Ckj is the cofactor of element ckj in J ea.
Now, setting dSea,k = 0 ∀ k 6= l ∈ Nea and dividing both sides by dSea,l gives
∂xea,j
∂Sl
= −
(
Clj
|J ea|
)
∀ j, l ∈ Nea. (A.13)
Recall that J ea is negative definite, which implies that its inverse J
−1
ea is
non-positive. Thus, Cki|Jep| < 0 ∀ k, i ∈ Nep. It follows that the right hand
side of (A.13) must be positive (i.e.,
∂xea,j
∂Sl
> 0). Hence, an increase in the
internalisation effect of any ex-ante agent increases equilibrium investment
of all ex-ante agents. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) For a given control structure β; when investments are simultaneous then
the internalisation effect is zero by assumption Sj = 0 ∀ j ∈ Nea but when
investments are sequential it can be negative, zero or positive. Lemma 3
showed that when the internalisation effect increases then ex-ante equilib-
rium investments increase. Therefore, if the internalisation effect is suffi-
ciently large (positive) in equilibrium then ex-ante equilibrium investment
can be higher under sequential investment than under simultaneous invest-
ment. The converse is also true, if the internalisation effect is negative and
sufficiently large it is possible that ex-ante equilibrium investment is lower
under investment sequencing than under simultaneous investment.
(ii) If at least one ex-ante agent increases equilibrium investment and no ex-
ante agents decrease equilibrium investment then by Lemma 1 investment
incentives of all ex-post agents increase because investments are complemen-
tary. Also, the introduction of sequencing makes ex-post contracting possible
which by Lemma 2 increases ex-post incentives. These two effects work in
the same direction and hence ex-post equilibrium investment always increases
when investment sequencing is introduced and some ex-ante agents increases
equilibrium investment.
However, (iii) if some ex-ante agents decrease equilibrium investment, then
by Lemma 1 the some ex-post agents may reduce equilibrium investment.
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But the introduction of sequencing also makes ex-post contracting possible
which by Lemma 2 increases ex-post incentives. These two effects work in
opposite directions and hence the impact of investment sequencing on ex-post
equilibrium investment is ambiguous when ex-ante investment falls. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Define function
G(β, λ|x) =
∑
S
p(S)v(S, β(S)|x)−
∑
j∈Nea
Cj(xea,j)−
∑
i∈Nep
∑
l∈N
λilCi(xep,i)
and let β be a more inclusive control structure than β′.
For a representative ex-ante agent j ∈ Nea define the function
f(α, xea,j) = αG(β, λ|xea,j, x−j) + (1− α)G(β′, λ|xea,j, x−j)
for α ∈ [0, 1], where x−j2 is exogenous and let xea,j(α) solve
∂f(α, xea,j(α))
∂xea,j
= 0. (A.14)
Totally differentiating (A.14) and taking α as the exogenous variable, gives
dxea,j
dα
= −
∂2f(α,xea,j(α))
∂xea,j∂α
∂2f(α,xea,j(α))
∂x2ea,j
(A.15)
where
∂2f(α,xea,j(α))
∂x2ea,j
= α
[
∂2Bj(β)
∂x2ea,j
− ∂2Cj
∂x2ea,j
]
+ (1 − α)
[
∂2Bj(β
′)
∂x2ea,j
− ∂2Cj
∂x2ea,j
]
< 0 by
Assumptions 3 & 6, while
∂2f(α,xea,j(α))
∂xea,j∂α
=
[
∂Bj(β)
∂xea,j
− ∂Cj
∂xea,j
]
−
[
∂Bj(β
′)
∂xea,j
− ∂Cj
∂xea,j
]
≥
0 follows from Assumption 9. Hence,
dxea,j
dα
≥ 0 ∀j ∈ Nea and xea,j(1) ≥
xea,j(0) or x
e
ea,j(β) ≥ xeea,j(β′) ∀j ∈ Nea.
For ex-post agents, the proof that xeep,i(β) ≥ xeep,i(β′) ∀i ∈ Nep is analogous
and will be omitted.
Thus, a more inclusive control structure always increases ex-ante and ex-post
2x−j = {xep, xea,1, . . . , xea,j−1, xea,j+1, . . . , xea,J} is the set of all other investments.
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investment incentives and increases equilibrium investment. Therefore, the
most inclusive control structure gives the highest investment incentives and
maximises (second best) equilibrium investment and is optimal. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4
Define function
G(β, λ|xea, xep) =
∑
S
p(S)v(S, β(S)|xea, xep)−
∑
j∈Nea
Cj(xea,j)−
∑
i∈Nep
∑
l∈N
λilCi(xep,i)
where xea is observed and taken as given by the ex-post agents.
3 Let β be a
more inclusive control structure than β′ and define function
f(α, xep) = αG(β, λ|xea, xep) + (1− α)G(β′, λ|xea, xep)
for α ∈ [0, 1] and let xep(α) solve
∂f(α, xep(α))
∂xep,i
= 0 ∀ i ∈ Nep. (A.16)
Totally differentiating (A.16) and taking α as the exogenous variable gives
Hf(α,xep)
dxep,1· · ·
dxep,I
 = −

∂G(β,λ|xea,xep(α))
∂xep,1
− ∂G(β′,λ|xea,xep(α))
∂xep,1
· · ·
∂G(β,λ|xea,xep(α))
∂xep,I
− ∂G(β′,λ|xea,xep(α))
∂xep,I
 dα (A.17)
where Hf(α,xep) is the Hessian matrix of f(α, xep). By Assumptions 3 and 6
the elements on the main diagonal are negative and by Assumption 5 the off
diagonal elements are all positive. It follows thatHf(α,xep) is negative definite
and H−1f(α,xep) is non-positive. Pre-multiplying both sides by H
−1
f(α,xep)
and
3The proofs of Lemma 4 and Proposition 3 are similar to the proof of Proposition 1 in
Hart & Moore (1990).
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dividing by dα gives
∂xep,1
∂α
· · ·
∂xep,I
∂α
 = −H−1f(α,xep)

∂G(β,λ|xea,xep(α))
∂xep,1
− ∂G(β′,λ|xea,xep(α))
∂xep,1
· · ·
∂G(β,λ|xea,xep(α))
∂xep,I
− ∂G(β′,λ|xea,xep(α))
∂xep,I
 . (A.18)
where ∂G(β,λ|xea,xep(α))
∂xep,i
− ∂G(β′,λ|xea,xep(α))
∂xep,i
≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ Nep follows from As-
sumption 9. Hence, ∂xep,1
∂α
≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ Nep, which implies xep(1) ≥ xep(0) or
R(β, λ|xea) ≥ R(β′, λ|xea). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Define function
G(β, λ|xea, R) =
∑
S
p(S)v(S, β(S)|xea, R)−
∑
j∈Nea
Cj(xea,j)−
∑
i∈Nep
∑
l∈N
λilCi(Ri)
where R = R(β, λ|xea) is the implicit optimal response function of the ex-
post agents. Let β be a more inclusive control structure than β′ and define
function
f(α, xea) = αG(β, λ|xea, R) + (1− α)G(β′, λ|xea, R)
for α ∈ [0, 1] and let xea(α) solve
∂f(α, xea(α))
∂xea,j
= 0 ∀ j ∈ Nea. (A.19)
Totally differentiating (A.19) and taking α as the exogenous variable gives
Hf(α,xea)
dxea,1· · ·
dxea,J
 = −

∂G(β,λ|xea(α),R)
∂xea,1
− ∂G(β′,λ|xea(α),R))
∂xea,1
· · ·
∂G(β,λ|xea(α),R))
∂xea,J
− ∂G(β′,λ|xea(α),R))
∂xea,J
 dα (A.20)
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where Hf(α,xea) is the Hessian matrix of f(α, xea). By Assumptions 3, 6
and 8 the elements on the main diagonal are negative and by Assumptions
5 and 8 the off diagonal elements are all positive. It follows that Hf(α,xea)
is negative definite and H−1f(α,xea) is non-positive. Pre-multiplying both sides
by H−1f(α,xea) and dividing by dα gives
∂xea,1
∂α
· · ·
∂xea,I
∂α
 = −H−1f(α,xea)

∂G(β,λ|xea(α),R)
∂xea,1
− ∂G(β′,λ|xea(α),R)
∂xea,1
· · ·
∂G(β,λ|xea(α),R)
∂xea,J
− ∂G(β′,λ|xea(α),R)
∂xea,J
 . (A.21)
Decomposition of ∂G(β,λ|xea(α),R)
∂xea,j
− ∂2G(β′,λ|xea(α),R)
∂xea,j
∀ j ∈ Nea reveals[
∂Bj(β | xea(α), R(β))
∂xea,j
− ∂Bj(β
′ | xea(α), R(β′))
∂xea,j
]
+
[
∂Cj(xea,j(α))
∂xea,j
− ∂Cj(xea,j(α))
∂xea,j
]
+ [Sj(β, λ|xea(α))− Sj(β′, λ|xea(α))]
∀ i ∈ Nea. Clearly, ∂Cj(xea,j(α))∂xea,j −
∂Cj(xea,j(α))
∂xea,j
= 0 and by Assumption 9
and Lemma 4
∂Bj(β|xea(α),R(β))
∂xea,j
− ∂Bj(β′|xea(α),R(β′))
∂xea,j
≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ Nea. However,
no restriction has been placed on the internalisation effect. It follows that
if Sj(β, λ|xea(α)) − Sj(β′, λ|xea(α)) < 0 for some i ∈ Nea then it is possi-
ble that
∂xea,i
∂α
≤ 0 for some or all i ∈ Nea. Thus, xea,j(1) ≤ xea,j(0) or
xeea,j(β) ≤ xeea,j(β′) for some or all i ∈ Nea is a possibility when all assets are
complementary at the margin. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that control structure β is more inclusive than control structure
β′ but that only ex-post agents are targeted, which means that β(S) =
β′(S) ∀ S | S ∩ Nea 6= ∅ (the control structure of all coalitions containing
ex-ante agents remains unchanged).
Proceed as in the proof of Proposition 3 and derive (A.21). The situa-
tion is very similar to Proposition 3 and Sj(β, λ|xea(α))− Sj(β′, λ|xea(α)) <
0 ∀ i ∈ Nea is a possibility. However, while still positive, ∂Bj(β|xea(α),R(β))∂xea,j −
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∂Bj(β
′|xea(α),R(β′))
∂xea,j
≥ 0 is smaller ∀ i ∈ Nea compared to a more inclusive con-
trol structure that also targets ex-ante agents, because here control rights
of ex-ante investors are explicitly assumed to be unchanged (no coalitions
containing ex-ant investors control more assets).
The reason why the term is still positive, is that ex-ante investors anticipate
the increase in ex-post investment that is associated with a more inclusive
control structure (Lemma 4), which means they will be working with more
productive co-workers.
Thus, if Sj(β, λ|xea(α)) − Sj(β′, λ|xea(α)) < 0 ∀ i ∈ Nea (for example, be-
cause marginal costs increase strongly) then the negative impact on ex-ante
incentives is greater than under a more inclusive control structure that tar-
gets both investor groups, because the increase in marginal return is smaller.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose that control structures β′ is such that |β′(l)| = 1 ∀ l ∈ N1(N1 6= ∅)
and |β′(l)| = 0 ∀ l ∈ N0 and that control structure β is similar in all respects
except that |β(i)| = 2 for exactly one agent i ∈ N1 ∩ Nea(N1 ∩ Nea 6= ∅).
Then β is more inclusive than β′.
It can be shown that R(β, λ|xea) ≤ R(β′, λ|xea) when Assumption 11 holds.
Call this Fact 1. The proof is analogous to Lemma 4 and will be omitted.
Define G(β, λ|xea, R) and f(α, xea) as in the proof of Proposition 3 and pro-
ceed identically to derive (A.21).
Decomposition of ∂G(β,λ|xea(α),R)
∂xea,j
− ∂2G(β′,λ|xea(α),R)
∂xea,j
∀ j ∈ Nea reveals[
∂Bj(β | xea(α), R(β))
∂xea,j
− ∂Bj(β
′ | xea(α), R(β′))
∂xea,j
]
+ [Sj(β, λ|xea(α))− Sj(β′, λ|xea(α))]
∀ i ∈ Nea.4 By Assumption 9 and Fact 1 ∂Bj(β|xea(α),R(β))∂xea,j −
∂Bj(β
′|xea(α),R(β′))
∂xea,j
≤
0 ∀ i ∈ Nea.
4Note that
[
∂Cj(xea,j(α))
∂xea,j
− ∂Cj(xea,j(α))∂xea,j
]
= 0 and drops out.
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The response of the internalisation effect Sj to the change in property rights
is not restricted, and therefore, due to Fact 1 (R(β) ≤ R(β′)) it is possible
that∑
i∈Nep
[
∂Bj(β | xea(α), R(β))
∂Ri
∂Ri(β)
∂xea,j
− ∂Bj(β
′ | xea(α), R(β′))
∂Ri
∂Ri(β
′)
∂xea,j
]
<
∑
i∈Nep
[
λij
∂Ci(Ri(β
′))
∂Ri
∂Ri(β
′)
∂xea,j
− λij ∂Ci(Ri(β))
∂Ri
∂Ri(β)
∂xea,j
]
∀ j ∈ Nea, which implies that Sj(β, λ|xea(α))−Sj(β′, λ|xea(α)) > 0 ∀ i ∈ Nea
is feasible. In other words, it is possible that the decrease of the internal-
isation effect on ex-ante marginal costs (right hand side of the inequality)
is greater than the decrease of the internalisation effect on ex-ante marginal
return (left hand side of the inequality).
It follows that Sj(β)−Sj(β′) > ∂Bj(β
′|xea(α),R(β′))
∂xea,j
− ∂Bj(β|xea(α),R(β))
∂xea,j
∀ j ∈ Nea
is also possible. Hence,
∂xea,j
∂α
≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ Nea is feasible, which implies that
xea,j(1) ≥ xea,j(0) or xeea,j(β) ≥ xeea,j(β′) ∀ j ∈ Nea is a possibility when all
assets (in the absence of some agents) are substitutes at the margin.
Recall Lemma 1, which states that
∂Ri(β,λ|xep,i)
∂xea,j
> 0 ∀ i ∈ Nep and ∀ j ∈ Nea.
Thus, it is possible that the decrease in ex-post incentives (due to Fact 1) can
be offset by the increase in ex-ante equilibrium investment which increases
ex-post incentives (Lemma 1). Hence, xeep,j(β) ≥ xeea,j(β′) ∀ i ∈ Nep is a
possibility.
It follows that giving an ex-post agent control over two substitute assets can
increase not only ex-ante equilibrium investment (xeea,j(β) ≥ xeea,j(β′) ∀ j ∈
Nea) but can also, counter-intuitively, increase ex-post equilibrium invest-
ment (xeep,j(β) ≥ xeea,j(β′) ∀ i ∈ Nep) under the right conditions. Q.E.D.
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